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The Marckx Case
The Impact on European Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights' 1979
Marckx Decision Declaring Belgian
Illegitimacy Statutes Violative of the
European Convention on Human Rights
MARC SALZBERG*
[W]bilst recognizing as legitimate or even praiseworthy the aim pur-
sued by the Belgian legislation - namely, protection of the child and
traditional family -, the Court stated that in the achievement of this
end, recourse must not be had to measures whose object or result is,
as in the present case, to prejudice the "illegitimate" family.'
With the above-stated rationale, the European Court of Human
Rights, in its decision of June 13, 1979 in the Marckx case, called for the
final dismantling of the legal disabilities that had been imposed for cen-
turies on "non-marital"2 children throughout Europe. Notwithstanding
* Mr. Salzberg is now in private practice in Denver, Colorado and teaches law-related
courses at the University of Denver and Metropolitan State College, Denver.
1. Marckx Case, 1979, Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 414 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights). For the full text of the Marckx decision, see: Eur. Court H.R., Marckx case,
judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31 [hereinafter cited as ECHR-Marckx]. Studies of
the Marckx case may be found in: E. Alkema, Verwandtschaft des nichtehelichen Kindes /
Einfluss der Marckx-Entscheidung des EGMR [Kinship of the non-marital child] / Influ-
ence of the Marckx decision of the ECHR-Court], EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT
[EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REVIEW] 213-215 (1980); Bossuyt, L'arret Marckx de la
cour europeenne des droits de l'homme [The Marckx decision of the European Court of
Human Rights], 15 REVUE BELGE DE Dsorr INTERNATIONAL [BELGIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW
REVIEW] 322-325 (1980-82); A. HEYVAERT & H. WILLEKENS, BEGINSELEN VAN HEr GEZINS-EN
FAMILIERECHT NA HET MARCKXARREST. DE THEORIE VAN HET MARCKXARREST EN HAAR WEER-
SLAG OP HEr GELDEND RECHT [PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR AND EXTENDED FAMILY LAW AFTER THE
MARCKX DECISION. THE THEORY OF THE MARCKX DECISION AND ITS APPLICATION TO OPERATIVE
LAW.] 1-142 (1981); Rigaux, La loi condamn~e. A propos de l'arrt europ~enne du 13 juin
1979 de la cour europkenne des droits de l'homme [The Condemned Law: Concerning the
June 13, 1979 decision of the ECHR-Court] 1979 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [COURT RE-
PORTER] 513-24; Van Hove, Het Marckx-arrest en de notariele praktijk [The Marckx deci-
sion and notarial practice], 4 TmSCHRIFT VOOR NOTARISSEN [REVIEW FOR NOTARIES] 97
(1982).
2. In modern English legal terminology, the derogatory term of "bastard" has been re-
placed most frequently by "illegitimate" or, more recently, "born out of wedlock". The com-
mon law expression, however, was "bastard". The unlawful connotation of "illegitimate"
makes it hardly much more of an improvement over "bastard". "Child born out of wedlock"
is stiff and cumbersome. Some authors have used the more neutral expressions "ex-marital"
or "ex-nuptial"-two imprecise expressions which may be improperly taken to mean "for-
merly married" rather than "outside of marriage." The preference in this article is for "non-
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solemn church canons, the time-honored Napoleonic Code, and contrary
national legislation, the European Court of Human Rights proclaimed
throughout the 21 nations' of Europe which respect its decisions that
henceforth children-whether born inside or outside of marriage-should
be born free of any legal disability or discrimination resulting from their
parents' marital status.
This article will assess Marckx by first focusing on the illegitimacy
laws prior to Marckx. Then it will analyze and appraise the Marckx deci-
sion. Next it will focus on the aftermath of Marckx in European national
courts during the four subsequent years, 1979-1983.
I. BACKGROUND ON ILLEGITIMACY IN EUROPEAN LAW AND CUSTOM
Over the centuries, European tradition had made into law the bibli-
cal notion that "the sins of the fathers shall be visited upon their chil-
dren."' Adulterous, incenstuous or simply unmarried relationships were
designated as "illegitimate". By no semantic accident, the children of
such relationships were called "illegitimate" too. Since sexual relations
between unmarried persons were outside the law, the issue of those extra-
legal acts was "illegitimate", tainted with sin - in short, "bastards". 5
Embodying and codifying that set of beliefs, the Napoleonic Codeo
determined the law pertaining to illegitimacy for almost the last two cen-
turies in much of Europe.7 To enforce the notion that the only rightful
marital". It is the direct translation of the German term nichtehelich. See Klette, Nichtehe-
lich-Nicht 'unehelich' [Non-marital-not 'unmarried'], FAMILIEN RECHT ZEITUNG [FAMILY
LAW JOURNAL] 206-07 (1967). Nevertheless, for lack of a better expression, the word "illegiti-
macy" shall be used in this article to describe the noun form of the condition, while "non-
marital" remains the choice for the adjective.
3. These are the 21 countries which were Member States of the Council of Europe as of
January 1, 1984: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights is affiliated with the Council of Europe. On the Council of
Europe, see, A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1977).
4. This expression comes from the Second Commandment Exodus 20:4. The words are
ascribed to the Supreme Judge, whose full pronouncement was: "For I, the Lord, thy God,
am a jealous God, visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and
fourth generation of them that hate me."
5. The word "bstqrd" derives from the French btztard, which means fits de bast, or,
literally, "pack-saddle child".
6. On the Napoleonic Code, see generally: ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM (1957); MAURICE SHELDOM AMOS AND FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, INTRODUC-
TION TO FRENCH LAW (1967); RENE DAVID AND H.D. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM
(1957); FREDERICK HENRY LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW (1955).
7. The illegitimacy provisions of the Napoleonic Code, which so long determined the
law in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain and Portu-
gal, have now been reformed or abandoned in most of these nations within the last 15 years.
On reforms in European illegitimacy laws, see generally Krause, Creation of Relations of
Kinship, 4 INT. ENCYC. Comp. L. 6:1 (1973). On illegitimacy in European legal tradition, see
also Stoljar, Children, Parents and Guardians, 4 INT. ENCYC. CoMP. L. 7:1 (1973); SCHMIDT-
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place for children was as the issue of a lawful marriage, the Napoleonic
Code made a child not the result of such a bond suffer extraordinary disa-
bilities. Thus, the encouragement to marry was often a manipulation of
the parents' desire not to have their children suffer because of the par-
ents' improprieties. The result was unabashed discrimination.
Under the Code, parents could voluntarily recognize their non-mari-
tal children and thereby establish the legal relationship of parenthood,
unless the children were the fruit of an incestuous or adulterous relation-
ship. The acknowledgment needed, however, to be voluntary on the par-
ents' part. "La recherche de la paternit" ("hunting down the father")
was specifically proscribed. The relationship between the non-marital
child and its mother was not established by the fact of birth. 8 If the
mother did not voluntarily acknowledge the child, the child needed to
prove maternity in court by showing the confinement of his alleged
mother and by establishing that he is the child to whom she gave birth.
Moreover, the Napoleonic Code distinguished not only between "legiti-
mate" and "illegitimate" children, but distinguished further between
"natural simple"', "adulterous"' and "incestuous"'" children. Unlike nat-
ural simple children, adulterous and incestuous children, according to the
old code, could not be acknowledged by their parents, and their paternity
or maternity could not be declared judicially, where this would show the
adulterous or incestuous nature of the parents' connection. 2
As to inheritance rights' s, the Napoleonic Code allowed an "illegiti-
mate" child to inherit from his unmarried mother, but he was not allowed
to inherit from his mother's relatives as of right, for he had no intestacy
rights in the succession of his parents' relatives, even of his own grand-
HIDDING, DIE STELLUNG DES UNEHELICHEN KINDES IN DEN ROMANISCHEN RECHTSORDNUNGEN
EUROPAS [THE POSITION OF THE NON-MARrrAL CHILD UNDER ROMAN LEGAL SYSTEMS OF Eu-
ROPE] (1967).
8. On the relations between the mother and her illegitimate child, in evolving French
law, see: Savatier, L'6volution de la condition juridique des enfants naturels en droit fran-
cais [The Evolution of the Legal Condition of Illegitimate Children in French law], in J.
DABIN, LE STATUT JURIDIQUE DE L'ENFANT NATUREL [THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ILLEGITI-
MATE CHILD] 4:37 (1965).
9. Father and mother are not married at the time of the child's conception or birth, and
no legal impediment would have prevented their marriage.
10. Father and/or mother are married at the time of the child's conception, but not to
each other.
11. Father and mother are related by blood or affinity to a degree which legally impedes
marriage.
12. Specifically on voluntary acknowledgment of parenthood in European law, see
Lasok, Legitimation, Recognition and Affiliation Proceedings: A Study in Comparative
Law and Legal Reform, 10 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 123 (1961); Meulders-Klein, Fondements
nouveaux du concept de filiation [New Foundations for the Concept of Affiliation], 1973
ANNALES DE DROIr (BELG.) [ANNALS OF LAW (BELG.)] 285.
13. On the inheritance rights of non-marital children in Europe, see generally Stone,
Illegitimacy and Claims to Money and Other Property: A Comparative Survey, 15 INT'L &
Coup. L.Q. 527 (1966).
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parents.1 ' An "illegitimate" child was classified not as an heir, but as an
irregular successor.13 In all intestate successions, his share was reduced
according to the number and status of the heirs with whom he was in
competition, and he was not allowed to receive by gifts or bequest more
than his statutory share."6 Owing to the dominance in Belgium and other
civil law countries of intestate succession and to statutory limitations
there on testamentary freedom, the result was to discriminate severely
against non-marital children in their inheritance rights.17
II. THE MARCKX CASE
In its Marckx opinion of June 13, 1979, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR-Court)' s held that certain Belgian statutes dis-
criminating against non-marital children, as these laws applied to the ap-
plicants, violated the right to respect for one's family life protected by
Article 819 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR-Con-
vention), both by itself and when read with Article 1420 prohibiting dis-
crimination based, inter alia, on birth.
A. Marckx: The Facts
The facts of Marckx are relatively simple. On October 16, 1973, near
Antwerp, Belgium, an unmarried Belgian national named Paula Marckx
gave birth to a daughter, Alexandra Marckx. The father was neither iden-
tified nor even mentioned in the proceedings. In 1974, Paula Marckx in-
troduced a complaint before the European Commission of Human Rights
14. Article 756 of the Napoleonic Code.
15. Id.
16. Articles 757, 760 and 908 of the Napoleonic Code.
17. On succession in common law systems as compared to succession in civil law sys-
tems, see generally: MAZEAUD, 4 LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL [LEssoNs IN CIVIL LAW] (1971).
18. The European Convention on Human Rights and its institutions, the European
Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights, are abundantly
documented. For updated bibliographies of the most recent articles, see the bibliography
section in each volume of: Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights). See also LAURIDS MIKALSEN, EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1980); A.H.
ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1982); A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1983).
19. The full text of Article 8 is:
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
20. The full text of Article 14 is: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth
in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
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(ECHR-Commission) on behalf of her infant daughter and herself. She
complained of Belgian law with respect to: 1) the maternal affiliation (ac-
knowledgment of parenthood) of a non-marital child, 2) the non-marital
child's family relationships, and 3) the non-marital child's inheritance
rights. The first two points need some explanation. First, under Belgian
law, a non-marital child is only regarded as the child of its mother if the
latter chooses to recognize her maternity. A marital child undergoes no
such delay; affiliation is proved simply by the legally obligatory entry of
the married mother's name on the birth certificate. Second, as regards
family relationships, a non-marital child remains, even after recognition,
in principle a stranger to his mother's family. Thus, for example, in the
absence of its mother, the state guardianship agency rather than its
grandparents has the power to consent to the child's marriage. The re-
verse is true of marital children.
B. Marckx: The Opinion
The ECHR-Court gave complete satisfaction to Paula Marckx's
claim on each count. In the introduction of its opinion, the ECHR-Court
formulated two general and significant statements of law. First, it con-
firmed that Article 8 (protecting "family life") of the ECHR-Convention
made no distinction between a marital and a non-marital family. Second,
the ECHR-Court indicated that Article 8 had a positive as well as a nega-
tive side. The Court held that Article 8:
does not merely compel the State to abstain from such [arbitrary] in-
terference; in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective "respect" for fam-
ily life.
This means, amongst other things, that when the State deter-
mines in its domestic legal system the regime applicable to certain
family ties such as those between an unmarried mother and her child,
it must act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned to lead a
normal family life. As envisaged by Article 8, respect for family life
implies in particular, in the Court's view, the existence in domestic
law of legal safeguards that render possible as from the moment of
birth the child's integration in his family. In this connection, the State
has a choice of various means, but a law that fails to satisfy this re-
quirement violates paragraph 1 of Article 8 without there being any
call to examine it under paragraph 2.21 [emphasis added]
C. Marckx: Judicial Activism
Until Marckx, the ECHR-Court had always interpreted Article 8 of
the ECHR-Convention as including only a negative duty of non-interfer-
ence in private family life. In Marckx, for the first time, the Court im-
plied from Article 8 "positive obligations" on States Party to provide for
21. ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, at 15, Section 31.
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"the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards", and thereby seem-
ingly appealed to the legislature and tribunals of States Party to reform
their domestic illegitimacy laws. Marckx signalled the adoption by the
ECHR-Court of a judicial "activism" that transcends the immediate con-
text of illegitimacy.
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court" under Chief Justice Warren came
under heavy fire from opponents of "judicial legislation", so has the
ECHR-Court been severely criticized in some circles for its "activist" ap-
proach-for law-making instead of law-interpreting. Two Belgian jurists
have stood out in their opposition. Both of them are law professors at
Belgian universities: Francois Rigaux of the Catholic University of Lou-
vain and Marc Bossuyt of Antwerp University.
Professor Bossuyt argues strongly against the Court's implying of
positive obligations and for the adoption of a "strict constructionist"
approach:
The transformation of classical freedoms, which impose essentially
negative obligations (duties to abstain) into social rights, which de-
mand a positive interpretation by the State, is difficult to justify sim-
ply by a court's interpretation. Except where the Convention contains
some indications allowing one to conclude that the States Parties were
ready to submit it to the positive obligations of control mechanisms of
the Convention, any interpretation transforming the negative contents
of a guaranteed right into a positive obligation is rebuttable. Such an
interpretation ends up in a considerable expansion-probably without
the States Parties having desired it-of the power of the Court. An
interpretation expanding the power of a court of international juris-
diction has no basis, however, in international law.23
Professor Rigaux objects even more strenuously to the "activism" in
the Marckx decision. He considers that "the Court has gone beyond its
mission by imposing on the States Parties the adoption of a specific sys-
tem for maternal legitimation. '24
22. With respect to illegitimacy, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown little of the judicial
activism of the ECHRCourt. The U.S. Supreme Court has been applying a balancing test
when deciding on the constitutionality of state statutes allegedly discriminating against non-
marital children. Thus a permissible legislative purpose of public policy is balanced with,
and may override, the goal of equal protection. Some state statutes have been condemned
while others have been -pheld; the Supreme Court has used an ad hoc approach rather than
articulating a clear standard of review. See Note, Protecting the Illegitimate's Right to In-
herit, 6 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 469-91 (1981); Guerin, Illegitimates and Equal Protection:
Lalli v. Lalli-A Retreat from Trimble v. Gordon, 57 DEN. L.J. 453-65 (1980); Metz, Trim-
ble v. Gordon and Lalli v. Lalli: Shall the Sins of the Fathers Be Visited Upon the Sons?,
48 CIN.L. REV. 578-88 (1979); Harris, "Legitimate Discrimination against Illegitimates" A
Look at Trimble v. Gordon and Fiallo v. Bell. 16 J. FAM. L. 57-75 (1977).
23. Bossuyt, L'arr~t Marckx de la Cour europ~enne des Droits de l'Homme [The
Marckx decision of the European Court of Human Rights], 15 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L
[BELGIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAw] 68, 68 (1980).
24. Rigaux, La loi condamn~e. A propos de l'arr&te du 13 juin 1979 de Ia Cour
europienne des droits de l'homme [The Condemned Law: Concerning the June 13, 1979
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The strongest articulation of the legal objections to the Marckx deci-
sion is contained in the dissenting opinion15 of the British judge sitting on
the ECHR-Court that tried the Marckx case. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has
been noted for his judicial conservatism as judge both on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and now on the ECHR-Court. 26 In Sir Gerald's
view, the Court's judgment in Marckx was "little else but a misguided
endeavour to read-or rather introduce-a whole code of family law into
Article 8 of the Convention, thus inflating it in a manner, and to an ex-
tent, wholly incommensurable with its true and intended proportions. ' 2
On the scope of Article 8, Fitzmaurice took the view that Article 8
dealt only with questions of state interference with family life and not
with state regulation of civil status by family law:
It is abundantly clear ... that the main, if not indeed the sole object
and intended sphere of application of Article 8 was that of what I will
call the "domiciliary protection" of the individual. He and his family
were no longer to be subjected to the four o'clock in the morning rat-
a-tat on the door; to domestic intrusions, searches and questionings to
examinations, delayings and confiscation of correspondence; to the
planting of listening devices (buggings); to telephone tapping and dis-
connection; to measures of coercion such as cutting off the electricity
or water supply; to such abominations as children being required to
report upon the activities of their parents, and even sometimes the
same for one spouse against another-in short the whole gamut of fas-
cist and communist inquisitorial practices such as had scarcely been
known, at least in Western Europe, since the eras of religious intoler-
ance and oppression, until (ideology replacing religion) they became
prevalent again in many countries between the two world wars and
subsequently. Such, and not the internal, domestic regulation of fam-
ily relationships, was the object of Article 8, and it was for the avoid-
ance of these horrors, tyrannies and vexations that "private and fam-
ily life..home and ... correspondence" were to be respected, and the
individual endowed with a right to enjoy that respect-not for the
regulation of the civil status of babies. 8
To understand why the Court chose to be so assertive in Marckx a
few factors need to be considered.
First, the illegitimacy issue was ripe, and the inequities were blatant.
The movement was already afoot in Europe to overhaul the system of
disabilities imposed by centuries-old statutes based on notions of shame
and transferred punishment not in tune with modern justice. There was
little organized opposition to reform, even in the most traditional circles.
decision of the ECHR-Court.] 1979 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [CouRT REPORTER] 513, 518.
25. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion, ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, 39-54.
26. About Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, see generally Merrills, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's
Contribution to the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, 1976-7 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 183.
27. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion, ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, No. 10-15."
28. Id., para. 7 at 41-42.
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Second, the Marckx decision may have also grown out of the Court's
desire to take a greater role in the movement toward European unity.
Such an ambition was never expressed in the opinion, but might still have
been very present in the judges' minds. By the late 1970s, despite Spain's
addition to the Council of Europe and ratification of the ECHR-Conven-
tion in 1979, the Council of Europe and its affiliated ECHR-Convention
institutions had seen their prestige eclipsed by the expanded European
Economic Community (EEC). By 1979, the first directly-elected deputies
sat in the EEC's European Parliament.
The EEC institution directly in "competition" with the ECHR-Court
is not the European Parliament but rather the Court of Justice of the
European Communities.2 It is often called the "Luxembourg Court", af-
ter the city and country where the court meets, as opposed to the "Stras-
bourg Court", i.e., the ECHR-Court. The Luxembourg Court first sat in
1955 and initially dealt only with economic matters. In contrast to the
judgments of the Strasbourg Court, those of the Luxembourg Court are
directly enforceable in the member states of the EEC, under Arts. 187
and 192 of the EEC Treaty. Moreover, the Luxembourg Court seeks di-
rectly to promote the unification or harmonization of the laws of the EEC
countries, while the ECHR institutions have not declared that as one of
their goals. Moreover, in recent years, the Luxembourg Court has ruled
on human rights issues as well as on economic issues.30 There is still no
specific declaration of human rights in the EEC Treaties- nothing like
the ECHR-Convention. The protection of fundamental rights has never-
theless been developed by the Luxembourg Court as an inherent part of
its duty to ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the EEC
Treaties, "the law is observed"."' So far, the Luxembourg Court has ruled
on issues like privacy, search and seizure, and speedy trial, but it has not
inquired into "respect for family life"."
The third factor needed to understand the Marckx court's judicial
activism is the applicability of ECHR-Court decisions to the domestic law
of States Party to the ECHR-Convention. This factor is discussed below.
29. On the Court of Justice of the European Communities, see MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1980); SCHERMEIS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNrrIES (1979); Schermers, Application of International Law by the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, in EssAYs ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LuAL
ORDER 169 (1980); Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitu-
tion, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Special Issue on the European Court, 8 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 515 (1975), which includes an annotated bibliography by I.I. Kavass.
30. On the human rights cases tried by the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties, see Sorensen, The Enlargement of the European Communities and the Protection of
Human Rights, in 1971 EUR. Y.B. 3 (Council of Europe); Pescatore, The Protection of
Human Rights in the European Communities, 1972 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 73.
31. Art. 164 of the EEC Treaty.
32. See generally the index of each annual bound volume of COMMON MKT. L. REV. for
a survey of the cases decided by the Luxembourg Court.
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D. Marckx: Enforceability of the Decision
The Marckx court could "afford" to be judicially active; it knew that
its decision would be respected. Though the decision was clear and forth-
right, it was not exactly bold and revolutionary. Nearly all of the States
Party had already committed themselves to reform at the time of
Marckx.3 3 The issue of non-marital children, like that of consenting ho-
mosexual behavior34 , is a relatively marginal one that does not threaten a
State's dignity.
The ECHR-Court wished to win over the trust of the States Party.
The member states, which accept the Court's jurisdiction to receive indi-
vidual petitions against them, must, according to Article 25 of the ECHR-
Convention, annually renew their declarations of acceptance. Six member
states-Cyprus, France, Greece, Malta, Spain and Turkey-do not even
recognize the Court's competence. The human rights cases that come
before the Court are matters relating directly to the sovereignty of na-
tions. The Court knows that it will not win this confidence by an adven-
turous brand of judicial activism.
The Court is acutely aware that it lacks an enforcement mechanism
and that compliance with its decisions is essentially discretionary. 5 It is
indeed quite remarkable that most member states have been willing to
waive formal objections to admissibility, accept applications against them
raised on their merits, cooperate with the ECHR Commission when trying
to settle out of court, and modify their legislation and administrative
practice. Member states often compensate individuals for the acts of their
own administrative authorities and courts of law. What the ECHR-Court
has achieved is precious and fragile. It has gained the cooperation of
many member states in allowing the ECHR-Court to point out deficien-
cies in their own systems of law. Against the backdrop of increased un-
willingness of nations to submit disputes for international judicial settle-
ment, the relative success of the ECHR-Court is indeed remarkable.
33. For the most up-to-date survey of.illegitimacy laws in Western Europe, especially as
regards inheritance rights, see Pauwels, De hervorming van het afstammingsrecht in West-
Europa [The reform of the law of descent in Western Europe], 3 TIJDSCHRFrr VOOR FAMILIE
EN JEUGDRECHT [REVIEW OF FAMILY AND JUVENILE LAw] 182 (1981). Countries with Napole-
onic Code legacies that had undergone major reforms in their illegitimacy laws were: France,
1972; Italy, 1975; Luxembourg, 1978; Netherlands, 1970; Portugal, 1966.
34. See also Dudgeon Case, Decisions on the European Convention on Human Rights
during 1981, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INTr'L L., 343-7]. In the Dudgeon case [Eur. Court H.R., Dudg-
eon case, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 47], the ECHR-Court for the first time
declared a homosexuality law violative of the ECHRConvention. The case arose out of the
complaint of an adult homosexual resident of Northern Ireland that Northern Irish law
rendered criminal any homosexual acts between consenting adult males. The court found
that the relevant statute constituted an unjustified interference with the petitioner's right to
respect for his private life, in breach of Article 8.
35. On implementing the ECHR-Convention in the States Party, see Buergenthal, The
Domestic Status of the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 BUFFALo L. REV. 354
(1963-4).
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The ECHR-Court has been cautious. It is this caution which allows
Marckx to be enforced, because the member states have confidence in the
Court's decisions. Thus, once the Court made its decision in Marcx, it
could be reasonably sure of eventual compliance by the member states'
domestic courts.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF MARCKX IN EUROPEAN NATIONAL COURTS
The domestic status of the ECHR-Convention as it relates to the na-
tional law of each member state varies widely. When the member states
ratified the ECHR-Convention, they agreed to Article 1 providing that:
"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their juris-
diction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Conven-
tion." 6 In fact, the member states have chosen to implement these guar-
antees by different methods, according to their own constitutional
practice. The means of implementation are essentially of two kinds: 1)
complete integration of the Convention into domestic law, or 2) the inte-
gration of only specific provisions of the Convention into domestic law
through legislation.
The states that completely integrated the Convention into their own
domestic law include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and
West Germany. Under Belgian law, the Convention is directly applicable,
so that the Convention has the force of law in that country. Once the
national judge in Belgium determines that the relevant provision of the
ECHR-Convention is "self-sufficient"-that is, clear and complete-he
can enforce that provision of the Convention, which is understood as be-
ing "self-executing" under Beligan law.3 7
The states that have not totally integrated the Convention into their
own domestic law include the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the
U.K. In those countries, where specific legislation has not incorporated
the provisions of the Convention, the Convention has legal effect only in
interstate relations with other member states.
A. Aftermath: Marckx As It Relates to Direct Applicability
The Marckx case raises peculiar problems as to the direct applicabil-
ity of the ECHR-Convention, or, to be more precise, Article 8 of the
36. Article 1, The European Convention on Human Rights (Convention of November 4,
1950 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
37. On the implementation of the ECHR-Convention in Belgium, see Bossuyt, The Di-
rect Applicability of International Instruments on Human Rights (with special reference
to Belgian and U.S. law), 15 REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 317 (1980-2). For a
general survey of changes that have been introduced in Belgian law as a result of findings by
the ECHR-Court, see De Meyer, Belgie en het Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de
rechten van de mens [Belgium and the ECHR- Convention], in BELGISCH BuITENLANDS
BELEID IN INTERNATIONALE BETREKKINGEN [BELGIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS] (De Raeymaeker ed. 1978).
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ECHR-Convention. In Belgium, the ECHR-Convention is directly appli-
cable and has been incorporated into Belgium law. Article 8 would then
be "self-executing" in Belgium if it were also self-sufficient-that is, clear
and complete. Many observers, however, say that the Article 8 guarantee
of protection of "family life" is extremely imprecise and therefore not
self-executing. In his comments on the Marckx judgment, Professor Fran-
cois Rigaux stated that Article 8 of the ECHR-Convention as interpreted
by the ECHR-Court in Marckx, was "not sufficiently precise to have di-
rect effect in national law."' 8
Part of the problem of imprecision arises out of the "evolutive" inter-
pretation by the Marckx court of the notion of "family life" in Article 8.
The Marckx court held that even if the signatories of the ECHR-Conven-
tion in 1950 considered non-marital families as falling outside under Arti-
cle 8 protection, even if they considered it normal at that time to distin-
guish between marital and non-marital children, that, nevertheless, an
evolution in social thought had occurred by 1979, leading to a consensus
that such a distinction was now discriminatory.39 The determination of
the evolution of social consensus is of course an area fraught with
imprecision.
Even more disturbing-because even more imprecise-is the clause
in the Marckx decision referring to "positive obligations inherent in an
effective 'respect' for family life"."0 Without articulating exactly what this
clause meant, the Marckx court stated that, in their domestic laws, mem-
ber states must "act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned
[non-marital families] to lead a normal family life." '41
This aspect of Marckx has come under a great deal of fire from Euro-
pean jurists. Professor Fritz Sturm of the Law Faculty of the University
of Lausanne, Switzerland, refers to the ECHR-Court's action of broaden-
ing Article 8, through uncertain "positive obligations", as "uber-
strapazierung", which can only be translated as "bootstrapping". 2 Pro-
38. Rigaux, supra note 24, at 523.
39. In the Marckx decision, the Court spelled out its commitment to make the Conven-
tion evolve with society:
Finally, in reply to an argument advanced by the [Belgian] Government,
the Court acknowledged that, at the time when the Convention was drafted, it
was regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to draw a
distinction in this area between the "illegitimate" and the "legitimate" family.
The Court however recalled that the Convention is to be interpreted in the
light of present-day conditions; it could not but be struck, it stressed, by the
evolution in the domestic law of the great majority of the Member States of
the Council of Europe towards equality between "legitimate" and "illegiti-
mate" children on the point under consideration.
Marckx Case, 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 414 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights).
40. ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, at 15, Section 31.
41. Id.
42. Sturm, Das Strassburger Marckx-Urteil zum Recht des nichtehelichen Kindes und
seine Folgen [The Strasbourg Marckx Decision as to the Law of Non-marital Children and
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fessor Jacques Velu of the Law Faculty of the Free University of Brussels
stated his vehement objection to the direct applicability of the Marckx
decision:
Insofar as Article 8 has negative obligations, meaning a prohibition
against the State's arbitrarily meddling in the private and family life
of individuals, it [the Marckx decision] enunciates a sufficiently pre-
cise and complete rule that takes on a directly applicable character.
Insofar as Article 8 includes positive obligations. . .,this holding
does not take on a directly applicable character, because, as soon as
several alternative means are available for the State to adopt in order
to implement this court instruction, the holding is not sufficiently pre-
cise or complete. To this extent, Article 8 imposes, in our mind, only
an obligation for the legislator to act, an obligation which should only
be invoked in national courts as one element, for interpretation ac-
cording to domestic law, but not as a principal source of controlling
law or obligation. 43
B. Aftermath: The Three Dutch and Belgian Cases
The three cases infra purport to represent all reported cases in Euro-
pean national courts that have cited Marckx in their decisions. There are
several reasons why of all 21 States Party, only in Belgium and in the
Netherlands were cases reported that cited Marckx. One reason is that in
many countries, most notably in Scandinavia"", illegitimacy laws have
been reformed to eliminate any discrimination against non-marital chil-
dren; no cases would be likely to arise. Among the other reasons for the
dearth of cases citing Marckx are: 1) the common practice throughout
Europe not to report any cases except the most important appellate
cases; 2) the non self-executing status of the ECHR-Convention in most
European countries, including France; and 3) the social context in many
European countries which prevents plaintiffs from bringing suits that
might attract public attention to their own non-marital status or to that
of their children. The three reported cases, two Belgian and one Dutch,
that did cite Marckx all involved statutes which were found to violate
Article 8 of the ECHR-Convention as interpreted by Marckx. Each case
sheds light on ramifications of the Marckx decision in specific and differ-
ent areas.
its Aftermath], 12 ZErrsCHRIvr FUR DES GESAMTE FAMILIENRECHT [FAMILY LAW REVIEW]
1150, 1154 (1982).
43. Velu, Les effets directs des instruments internationaux en matiere de droits de
t'homme [The Direct Effects of International Instruments Concerning Human Rights], 15
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [BELGIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 293, 314
(1980-2).
44. See supra note 7 and note 33. On illegitimacy statutes in the Scandinavian coun-
tries, see generally KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971) at 179-93.
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B.1 Supreme Court of the Netherlands: The "Adoption by Aunt"
Case of Nijmegen-decided January 18, 19808
Facts: Petronella Janssen, a Dutch national living in Nijmegen
(Netherlands), filed a motion on November 24, 1978 with a local Nijme-
gen court asking that she be allowed to officially adopt Leyla Janssen, a
minor child under her care. Leyla Janssen was born on November 16,
1974, the non-marital daughter of Anna Maria Janssen, who died on No-
vember 6, 1978, and who was the sister of Petronella Janssen. The iden-
tity of Leyla's father was never made known by her mother, and was
never declared.
Holding: In effect, Petronella Janssen wanted to adopt her sister's
non-marital four-year-old daughter, after her sister died and the child be-
came an orphan. Such an adoption procedure would have been quite nor-
mal under Article 959 of the Dutch Civil Code4 , which allows for adop-
tion of orphans by the next blood relative. Such an adoption would have
proceeded without any opposition if the aunt, Petronella Janssen, were
recognized by law as her niece Leyla's next blood relative. However, be-
cause Leyla was illegitimate, she was considered by Dutch law, as under
the Napoleonic Code, to have no blood relative other than her mother.
Therefore, the trial court at Nijmegen, in February, 1979, followed Dutch
law and declared her "a ward of the state" because she was without a
blood relative. In April, 1979, two months before Marckx, the Arnhem
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that the child's
only relative was her unmarried mother. As the plaintiff was not a rela-
tive within the meaning of Article 959, the motion to adopt could not be
granted.4
The Dutch Supreme Court rendered its decision on January 18, 1980.
It reversed the decision of the Arnhem Appellate Court and remanded
the case to that court with instructions to proceed with the case in a man-
ner that would make no distinction between marital and non-marital chil-
dren. Basing its holding specifically on Marckx, the Dutch Supreme
Court gave this explanation for its decision:
The legal distinction made between marital and non-marital children
has of late undergone sizable change. This development found expres-
sion in the ECHR-Court's judgment in the Marckx case in an inter-
45. De Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands], Case No.
463 of January 18, 1980, NEDERLANDSE JURISPRUDENTIE [DUTCH JURISPRUDENCE] 1460 (1980);
REPRINTED IN SUMMARY FORM IN Rechtspraak [Law Talk], No. 21, 7 NEDERLANDS JURISTEN-
BLAD [DUTCH LAWYERS' PAGE] 141 (1980); summarized and intepreted in German in: De
Hoge Raad der Nederland [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], Verwandtschaft des
nichtehelichen Kindes / Einfluss der Marckx-Entscheidung des EGMR [Kinship of the
non-marital child / Influence of the Marckx decision of the ECHR-Court], EUROPAISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT [EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REVIEW] 213 (1980).
46. Article 959, Civil Code of the Netherlands.
47. De Hoge Raad, supra note 45, at 1460.
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pretation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 of the ECHR-
Convention. The domestic judge must therefore take into account this
important evolution when examining matters which come before him
on this point.
With respect to the question whether in the instant case, Article
959 ought to be applied to the sister of the mother of a minor child,
even when the child is not a marital offspring of the mother, the need
for legal consistency does not oppose such an application. So then, for
all unadjudicated proceedings henceforth the applicable Dutch law is
that in this regard no distinction must be made between marital and
non-marital children."8
It appears that the Dutch Supreme Court gave the ECHR Conven-
tion, as interpreted in Marckx, the force of binding law that could over-
rule Dutch statutes. Without that binding force of the Convention, the
Dutch Supreme Court would have had, in the name of "legal consistency"
in a civil law jurisdiction, to rule against the aunt's motion, unless the
Dutch Parliament changed the law and gave it retroactive force.
B.2 Civil Tribunal of Ghent, Belgium: The "Granddaughter's In-
heritance" Case-decided November 20, 19809
Facts: When Elza D. died in 1978, her estate was to be divided up among
her heirs according to Belgian law. A problem arose because Elza D. had
only one child, a non-marital daughter, Denise, who, for unstated reasons,
refused to accept any part of her mother's estate. This non-marital
daughter, Denise, had married and had a marital child, Antonia, who was
an adult at the time of her grandmother's death. Antonia wanted very
much to inherit her grandmother's entire estate. If Denise had been a
marital child, Antonia would have been a "conventional" granddaughter.
As the only grandchild, Antonia would have been the closest heir in line
for the estate, and, under Belgian law, would have received the entire
estate. Antonia's mother's illegitimacy had barred her from doing so.
Meanwhile, certain "legitimate" nieces and nephews of the decedent had
opposed Antonia's claim to any part of the estate, and had argued for
their exclusive rights to the estate.
Under the Belgian Civil Code, a non-marital child has a blood rela-
tionship only with its mother and thus has the right to inherit only from
its mother and not from any extended family beyond. Thus, by Beligan
statutes, Antonia had no relationship to her grandmother, Elza D.
Holding: The judge refused to apply the relevant Belgian statutes, which
he considered to be violative of the ECHR-Convention:
The Belgian Civil Code therefore makes a distinction between the in-
heritance rights of legal [marital] offspring and the inheritance rights
48. Id. at 1462.
49. Burgerlijke Rechtbank Te Gent [Civil Tribunal of Ghent], Decision of November
20, 1980, RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD [WEEKLY LAW REPORTER SHEET] 2328 (1980-81).
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of natural [non-marital] offspring.
That discrimination is discriminatory and is in conflict with Arti-
cles 8 and 14 of the ECHR-Convention (signed in Rome on November
4, 1950) and with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (signed in Paris on
March 20, 1952), both ratified by Belgian and applicable in Belgian
law since June 14, 1955.
That is also the holding in the judgment of the ECHR-Court of
June 13, 1979 (Marckx case).60
B.3 Civil Tribunal of Turnhout, Belgium: The "Adulterous Child"
Case-decided April 29, 198251
Facts: Maria El. was married to Hans-Joachim K. for a number of years
until they separated in 1976. They continued to live apart, without di-
vorcing. Also in 1976, Maria El. began to live with Anastassios K., and
continued to live with him during the six years that followed, even though
she was still legally married to Hans-Joachim. In March, 1980, Maria
gave birth to a daughter, Stella, whom Hans-Joachim refused to recognize
as his own. Hans-Joachim and Maria were officially divorced in October,
1980. After Maria's divorce, Anastassios, with Maria's consent, petitioned
the Turnhout Civil Tribunal to allow him to be recognized as the child's
father.
Articles 333 and 335 of the Belgian Civil Code forbade any official
recognition of Anastassios's paternity of Stella. According to Article 331,
a "natural" ("non-marital" but not "adulterous") child could become "le-
gitimate" by its parents' marriage, but a non-marital child born of an
adulterous or incestuous relationship could not be so acknowledged. Ac-
cording to Article 335, the paternity or maternity of a non-marital child
could not be judicially declared where this would show the adulterous or
incestuous nature of the parents' connection.
Holding: The Belgian court held that Articles 331 and 335 violated the
ECHR-Convention and should not be applied, and that Anastassios's pa-
ternity should be officially acknowledged. The court's reasoning was as
follows:
Considering that in the given circumstances, the petition from Mr.
Eu. [Anastassios] concerning the child, Stella El., is not allowable
under Articles 331 and 335; that the petitioner, aware of the Marckx
decision of the ECHR-Court of June 13, 1979, contends that Articles 8
and 14 of the ECHR-Convention hold that a state which has ratified
the Convention must provide legal safeguards for the protection of
normal family life; that a non-marital child has as much right as the
50. Id. at 2329.
51. Burgerlijke Rechtbank Te Turnhout [Civil Tribuanl of Turnhout], Decision of April
29, 1982, RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD [WEEKLY LAW REPORTER SHEET] 1590 (1982-83). The
opinion is immediately followed by a comment: Pauwels, Noot: Overspelige kinderen en de
directe werking van het Marckxarrest [Note: Adulterous Children and the Direct Applica-
bility of the Marckx decision], at 1592-5.
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marital child to the recognition of its paternity; that the existence of a
non-marital family is entitled to enjoy the same safeguards as the ex-
istence of a marital family;
Considering that the rules with regard to the rights recognized by
Articles 2 through 12 of the Convention are directly applicable in na-
tional courts and have precedence over internal law. . . . Considering
that in this case the discriminatory distinction made by Articles 331
and 335 has no objective and reasonable justification, in the light of
the case law of the Marckx decision . . . [tihis tribunal . . declares
the petition granted and authorizes the recognition by Mr. Anastas-
sios Eu., . . . of his child, Stella El.. .5
C. Aftermath: The Three Dutch and Belgian Cases As Illustrations
of the Direct Applicability of Marckx
In these three cases, Dutch and Belgian judges directly applied Arti-
cle 8 of the ECHR-Convention as interpreted by Marckx, without con-
cerning themselves with the "positive obligations" aspect of the Marckx
decision. The judges in the three cases did not base their opinions on the
"positive obligations" clause in the Marckx opinion. The "positive obliga-
tions" clause, because of its vagueness, is unlikely to be cited by a na-
tional court as controlling authority in any future case. The clause can be
thought of as the Marckx court's policy statement. It is obiter dictum
that is not directly self-executing. Despite this dictum; the Marckx
court's interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR-Convention is directly ap-
plicable and self-executing in Belgium and the Netherlands.
Indeed, the direct applicability of the ECHR-Convention in the
Netherlands and Belgium is now a fait accompli that is newly, but firmly,
anchored in judicial tradition in those countries. Precisely in order to
strengthen the Convention's direct applicability, the ECHR-Court in the
Van Oosterwijck case 53 refused to try the case on the merits. Instead, it
decided that a Belgian court could best judge the applicant's claim, by
using the Marckx decision as a guideline. In Van Oosterwijck, the
ECHR-Court announced very clearly that violations of the ECHR-Con-
vention need not be heard by the ECHR-Commission and the Court, but
could and indeed should be heard by domestic courts, applying the Con-
vention directly, as did the courts in the Hague, Ghent and Turnhout.
IV. CONCLUSION
Centuries ago, decisions in family law affecting all the European
states were often made at Vatican Councils". In this way, for example,
52. Id. at 1590-1.
53. Eur. Court H.R., Van Oosterwijck case, judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no.
40.
54. On Vatican Councils and canon law, see generally A.G. CIGOGNANI, CANON LAW
(1934); R. METZ, WHAT IS CANON LAW? (1960); T.L. BOUSCAIIEN AND A.C. ELLIS, CANON LAW:
A TEXT AND COMMENTARY (1966); J.A. ABBO AND J.D. HANNAN, THE SACRED CANONS (1960).
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the Council of Trent in 1563 decided that informal marriage (cohabita-
tion) would cease to be recognized as a valid union by canon law. Now at
last Europe possesses a lay institution-the European Court of Human
Rights-whose decisions are respected by the Member States of the
Council of Europe. The law is an evolutive process. If discriminatory ille-
gitimacy statutes can trace their origin to the Council of Trent decision in
1563, they may also very well trace their demise to the Marckx decision
of 1979.

